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Abstract
In this paper we consider the problem to find a market portfolio that
minimizes the convex risk measure of the terminal wealth in a jump dif-
fusion market. We formulate the problem as a two player (zero-sum)
stochastic differential game. To help us find a solution, we prove a theo-
rem giving the HJBI conditions for a general zero-sum stochastic differen-
tial game in a jump diffusion setting. We then use the theorem to study
particular risk minimization problems. Finally, we extend our approach to
cover general stochastic differential games (not necessarily zero-sum), and
we obtain similar HJBI equations for the Nash equilibria of such games.
Key words: convex measure of risk, monetary utility function, optimal max-
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Nash equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
We study the problem of minimizing convex risk measures in a Le´vy market.
The paper [2] introduced the concept of a coherent risk measures as a measure
which is sub-additive, positive homogeneous, monotonic and translation invari-
ant. However, in [8] and [6], the idea was extended to relax the subadditivity
and positive homogeneity and substitute these with the convex property. It was
observed in [19] that the negative of a convex risk measure can be interpreted
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as a special utility function termed monetary utility function. As a result, risk
minimization leads to a max-min problem whose solution we are interested to
find.
This problem then extends to solving a zero-sum stochastic differential game
between an agent and a market. In order to simplify the max-min problem
that we get in the process, we formulate and prove a general Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman-Isaacs (HJBI) equation for two player stochastic differential games.
Our paper is designed as follows: In the next section we describe the jump
diffusion market model we want to deal with, and we formulate the risk min-
imizing problem as a zero-sum stochastic differential game problem (Problem
2.4). Then in Section 3 we state and prove an HJBI equation for such games
(Theorem 3.2). In Section 4 we apply Theorem 3.2 to study some risk minimiz-
ing portfolio examples. Finally, in Section 5 we extend our approach to cover
general stochastic differential games, not necessarily of zero-sum type, and we
prove an HJBI equation for determination of the Nash equilibria of such.
2 The market model
Let η(t) = η(t, ω); (t, ω) ∈ [0,∞)×Ω be a Le´vy process on a filtered probability
space (Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0, P ) satisfying the usual conditions. Let N(dt, dz) be the
jump measure of η(·) and let
ν(V ) = E[N((0, 1], V )]; V ⊂ R \ {0} Borel set
be the Le´vy measure of η(·), where E[·] denotes expectation with respect to P .
Define
N˜(dt, dz) = N(dt, dz)− ν(dz)dt,
the compensated Poisson random measure of η(·). We assume for simplicity
that
E[η2(t)] <∞ for all t ≥ 0.
Then by the Le´vy-Itoˆ decomposition theorem η(·) has the form
(2.1) η(t) = at+ bB(t) +
t∫
0
∫
R
zN˜(ds, dz); t ≥ 0
where a, b are constants and B(t) is a standard Brownian motion. In view of this
we see that when we deal with models involving integration with respect to η(t)
it is natural to consider linear combinations of dt-integrals, dB(t)-integrals (i.e.
classical Itoˆ integrals) and N˜(dt, dz)-integrals. This leads to Le´vy-Itoˆ processes
X(t) of the form
(2.2) dX(t) = α(t, ω)dt+ β(t, ω)dB(t) +
∫
R
γ(t, z)N˜(dt, dz)
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where α, β and γ are Ft-predictable processes satisfying
T∫
0
{
|α(t)|+ β2(t) +
∫
R
γ2(t, z)ν(dz)
}
dt <∞ for all T <∞.
We refer to [1] for more information about the stochastic calculus of Le´vy
processes. See also [25, Chapter 1].
We now consider such a model in finance: Let α, β and γ be as above, fix
T > 0 and let r(t) = r(t, ω) be adapted with
T∫
0
|r(t)|dt <∞ a.s. Suppose there
are two investment possibilities:
(i) a risk free asset (e.g. a bond), with unit price S0(t) at time t given by
(2.3) dS0(t) = r(t)S0(t)dt; S0(0) = 1
(ii) a risky asset (e.g. a stock), with unit price S1(t) given by
(2.4) dS1(t) = S1(t−)
[
α(t)dt+β(t)dB(t)+
∫
R
γ(t, z)N˜(dt, dz)
]
; S1(0) > 0
where we assume that γ(t, z) > −1 for a.a. t, z, a.s.
Let pi(t) be a portfolio, giving the proportion of the total wealth V (t) invested
in the stocks at time t. Then the dynamics of the corresponding wealth process
V (t) = V (pi)(t) is
dV (pi)(t) = V (pi)(t−)
[
{(1− pi(t))r(t) + pi(t)α(t)}dt(2.5)
+ pi(t)β(t)dB(t) + pi(t−)
∫
R
γ(t, z)N˜(dt, dz)
]
; V (pi)(0) > 0.
We require that pi(t−)γ(t, z) > −1 for a.a. t, z, a.s. and that
T∫
0
{
|(1− pi(t))r(t)|+ |pi(t)α(t)|+ pi2(t)β2(t) + pi2(t)
∫
R
γ2(t, z)ν(dz)
}
dt <∞ a.s.
We now pose the following problem:
Find the portfolio pi(t) that minimizes the risk of the terminal wealth(2.6)
V (pi)(T ).
As a measure of risk we will use the convex risk measure, introduced in
[8] and [6]. It is a generalization of the concept of a coherent risk measure,
introduced in [2].
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Definition 2.1 ([8], [6]) Let F be the family of all lower bounded FT -measurable
random variables. A convex risk measure on F is a map ρ : F→ R such that
(i) (convexity) ρ(λX + (1− λ)Y ) ≤ λρ(X) + (1− λ)ρ(Y ) for all X,Y ∈ F,
λ ∈ (0, 1),
(ii) (monotonicity) If X ≤ Y , X,Y ∈ F, then ρ(X) ≥ ρ(Y ),
(iii) (translation invariance) If X ∈ F and m ∈ R then
ρ(X +m) = ρ(X)−m.
In view of the general representation formula for convex risk measures (see
e.g. [8, Theorem 9]), we will assume that the risk measure ρ that we consider,
is of the following type:
(2.7) ρ(X) = sup
Q∈Ma
{EQ[−X]− ζ(Q)}
(where EQ denotes expectation with respect to Q), for some family Ma of
measures Q which are absolutely continuous with respect to P and for some
“penalty” function ζ :Ma → R. (See also [2], [4], [6] and [9].)
One possible choice of penalty function ζ(Q) is the relative entropy of Q with
respect to P , defined by
(2.8) ζ(Q) := I(Q;P ) := E
[
dQ
dP
log
dQ
dP
]
.
(See e.g. [13].)
A natural choice of the family Ma is the set of all measures Q = Qθ of
Girsanov transformation type, i.e.
(2.9) dQθ(ω) = Zθ(T )dP (ω) on FT
where θ = (θ0, θ1) and
(2.10) dZθ(t) = Zθ(t−)
[
− θ0(t)dB(t)−
∫
R
θ1(t, z)N˜(dt, dz)
]
; Zθ(0) = 1.
Here θ0(t) and θ1(t, z) are Ft-adapted processes, θ1(t, z) < 1 for a.a. t, z and
(2.11)
T∫
0
{
θ20(t) +
∫
R
θ21(t, z)ν(dz)
}
dt <∞ a.s.
Then by the Itoˆ formula the solution of the stochastic differential equation (2.10)
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is
Zθ(t) = exp
[
−
t∫
0
θ0(s)dB(s)− 12
t∫
0
θ20(s)ds
+
t∫
0
∫
R
log(1− θ1(s, z))N˜(ds, dz)
+
t∫
0
∫
R
{log(1− θ1(s, z)) + θ1(s, z)}ν(dz)ds; 0 ≤ t ≤ T.(2.12)
Remark 2.2 In particular, if θ0(t), θ1(t, z) are such that
(2.13) E[Z(T )] = 1
and
(2.14) β(t)θ0(t) +
∫
R
γ(t, z)θ1(t, z)ν(dz) = α(t)− r(t) for a.a. t,
then dQθ(ω) = Zθ(T )dP (ω) is an equivalent local martingale measure (see e.g.
[25, Ch. 1]), but we do not assume this here.
In view of (2.7) we can now make our risk minimizing portfolio problem
more precise:
(2.15) Given a convex risk measure ρ of the form (2.7) find the portfolio pi
which minimizes
sup
Q∈Ma
{EQ[−V (pi)(T )]− ζ(Q)}.
A related concept is the following (see e.g. [19]):
Definition 2.3 A monetary utility function is a map U : F → R with the
following properties:
(i)′ (concavity) U(λX + (1−λ)Y ) ≥ λU(X) + (1−λ)U(Y ), for all X,Y ∈F,
λ ∈ (0, 1).
(ii)′ (monotonicity) If X ≤ Y , X,Y ∈ F, then U(X) ≤ U(Y ).
(iii)′ (translation invariance) If X∈F and m∈R then U(X+m) = U(X)+m.
It is easily seen that if ρ is a convex risk measure, then U(X) := −ρ(X) is
a monetary utility function and conversely. Therefore, in view of (2.7) we have
the following general representation of a monetary utility function:
(2.16) U(X) = inf
Q∈Ma
{EQ[X] + ζ(Q)}.
Using this our risk minimizing portfolio problem (2.15) becomes equivalent to
the following monetary utility maximizing problem:
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Problem 2.4 Find
(2.17) Φ := sup
pi
(
inf
Q∈Ma
{EQ[V (pi)(T )] + ζ(Q)}
)
and find the optimal pi∗ and Q∗ such that
Φ = EQ∗
[
V (pi
∗)(T )
]
+ ζ(Q∗).
Remark 2.5 We may regard this as a game theoretic problem: The measure
Q is the control of player number 1 (the “market”), while the portfolio pi(t) is
the control of player number 2 (the representative agent/trader).
Problem 2.4 is a special case of a stochastic zero-sum differential game.
In the next sections we present a general formulation of such a game and we
give a general solution method in terms of a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs
(HJBI) equation. See Theorem 3.2 (for the zero-sum case) and Theorem 5.2
(for the Nash equilibrium case), which together with Example 4.1 and Theorem
5.4 are our main new results. To the best of our knowledge this is the first
time differential games of this type are studied in a jump diffusion context.
For deterministic systems similar differential games have been studied by many
authors. See e.g. [16], [5], [21] and [7] and the references therein. See also [11],
[14], [15], [22], [28] and [31] for papers of related interest.
A nice presentation of games in a general Markov process context is given in
[18]. For information on the existence of a value function in zero-sum stochastic
differential games see [10].
Problem 2.4 is related to what is also known as a robust utility maximization
problem. See e.g. [12] or [30] for a duality approach to such problems. A
stochastic control approach (different from ours) is presented in [3]. Another
paper of related interest is [20], where certain worst case crash scenarios are
studied using a stochstic control approach.
Risk measures can also be represented by g-expectations and hence by so-
lutions of backward stochastic differential equations. For more information we
refer to [26] and the references therein.
3 An HJBI equation for zero-sum stochastic dif-
ferential games
Suppose the equation for the state Y (t) = Y (u)(t) at time t has the form
dY (t) = b(Y (t), u0(t))dt+ σ(Y (t), u0(t))dB(t)(3.1)
+
∫
Rk
γ(Y (t−), u1(t−, z), z)N˜(dt, dz); Y (0) = y ∈ Rk,
Here b : Rk × K → Rk, σ : Rk × K → Rk×k and γ : Rk × K × Rk →
Rk×k are given functions, B(t) is a k-dimensional Brownian motion, N˜(·, ·) =
6
(N˜1(·, ·), . . . , N˜k(·, ·)) are k-independent compensated Poisson random measures
and K is a given subset of Rp.
The process u0(t) = u0(t, ω) and u1(t, z) = u1(t, z, ω) are our control pro-
cesses, assumed to be cadlag and adapted to the filtration Ft generated by the
driving processes B(·) and N˜(·, ·) (as usual augmented with all the P -null sets),
and with values u0(t) ∈ K, u1(t, z) ∈ K for a.a. t, z, a.s. We put u = (u0, u1)
and we call Y (u)(·) a controlled jump diffusion. We refer to [25] for more infor-
mation about stochastic control of jump diffusions.
Let f : Rk × K → R and g : Rk → R be given functions, called the profit
rate and bequest function, respectively. We assume that we are given a family
A of admissible controls, contained in the set of controls u(·) such that (3.1) has
a unique strong solution and such that
(3.2) Ey
[ τS∫
0
|f(Y (t), u0(t))|dt+ |g(Y (τS))|
]
<∞
for all y ∈ S, where S ⊂ Rk is a given open set (called the solvency region),
(3.3) τS = inf{t > 0;Y (t) 6∈ S}
is the bankruptcy time and Ey denotes expectation given that Y (0) = y ∈ Rk.
For u ∈ A we define the performance functional Ju(y) by
(3.4) Ju(y) = Ey
[ τS∫
0
f(Y (t), u0(t))dt+ g(Y (τS))
]
.
Here, and in (3.2), we interpret g(Y (τS)) as 0 if τS =∞.
Now suppose that the controls u0(t) and u1(t, z) have the form
u0(t) = (θ0(t), pi0(t)) ; t ≥ 0(3.5)
u1(t, z) = (θ1(t, z), pi1(t, z)) ; (t, z) ∈ [0,∞)× Rk(3.6)
Just as in the example discussed in Section 2 we may regard θ := (θ0, θ1) as the
control of player number 1, while pi := (pi0, pi1) is the control of player number
2.
Let Θ and Π be given families of admissible controls θ = (θ0, θ1) and pi =
(pi0, pi1), respectively. Let K1,K2 be two sets such that θ(t, z) ∈ K1 and
pi(t, z) ∈ K2 for a.a. t, z, ω. The general zero-sum stochastic differential game
problem is the following
Problem 3.1 Find Φ(y) and (θ∗, pi∗) ∈ Θ×Π such that
(3.7) Φ(y) = sup
pi∈Π
(
inf
θ∈Θ
Jθ,pi(y)
)
= J (θ
∗,pi∗)(y).
The function Φ is called the value function and (θ∗, pi∗) is called an optimal
control (if it exists).
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In classical stochastic control theory it is well-known that under mild con-
ditions Markov controls can give just as good performance as the more general
adapted controls. See e.g. [23, Theorem 11.2.3]. In view of this we will restrict
ourselves to consider only Markov controls in Problem 3.1. Hence we assume
that
θ0(t) = θ¯0(Y (t)), pi0(t) = p¯i0(Y (t)), θ1(t, z) = θ¯1(Y (t), z)(3.8)
and pi1(t, z) = p¯i1(Y (t), z)
for some function θ¯0 : S → K1, p¯i0 : S → K2, θ¯1 : S × Rk → K1 and p¯i1 :
S × Rk → K2.
As customary we do not distinguish notationally between θ0 and θ¯0, pi0 and
p¯i0, θ1 and θ¯1 and pi1 and p¯i1. Thus our controls can simply be identified with
(deterministic) functions θ0(y), pi0(y), θ1(y, z) and pi1(y, z); y ∈ S, z ∈ Rk
(sometimes also called feedback controls).
When the control u = (θ, pi) ∈ Θ×Π is Markovian, the corresponding system
(3.1) becomes a jump diffusion, whose generator Aθ,pi is given by
Aθ,piϕ(y) =
k∑
i=1
bi(y, θ0(y), pi0(y))
∂ϕ
∂yi
(y)(3.9)
+ 12
k∑
i,j=1
(σσT )ij(y, θ0(y), pi0(y))
∂2ϕ
∂yi∂yj
(y)
+
k∑
j=1
∫
R
{ϕ(y + γ(j)(y, θ1, (y, zj), pi1(y, zj), zj))− ϕ(y)
−∇ϕ(y) · γ(j)(y, θ1(y, zj), pi1(y, zj), zj)}νj(dzj);
where ϕ ∈ C20 (Rk) (the twice continuously differentiable functions with compact
support on Rk). Here ∇ϕ = ( ∂ϕ∂y1 , . . . , ∂ϕ∂yk ) is the gradient of ϕ and γ(j) is the
j’th column of the k × k matrix γ.
We let T denote the set of all Ft-stopping times τ ≤ τS .
We can now state the first main result of this paper:
Theorem 3.2 (An HJBI equation for zero-sum differential games for
jump diffusions) Suppose there exists a function ϕ ∈ C2(S) ∩ C(S¯) and a
Markov control (θˆ(y), pˆi(y)) ∈ Θ×Π such that
(i) Aθ,pˆi(y)ϕ(y) + f(y, θ, pˆi(y)) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ K1, y ∈ S
(ii) Aθˆ(y),piϕ(y) + f(y, θˆ(y), pi) ≤ 0 for all pi ∈ K2, y ∈ S
(iii) Aθˆ(y),pˆi(y)ϕ(y) + f(y, θˆ(y), pˆi(y)) = 0 for all y ∈ S
(iv) Y θ,pi(τS) ∈ ∂S a.s. on {τS <∞} and
lim
t→τ−S
ϕ(Y θ,pi(t)) = g(Y θ,pi(τS))χ{τS<∞} a.s. for all (θ, pi)∈Θ×Π, y∈S
(v) the family {ϕ(Y θ,pi(τ))}τ∈T is uniformly integrable,
for all y ∈ S, (θ, pi) ∈ Θ×Π.
8
Then
ϕ(y) = Φ(y) = sup
pi∈Π
(
inf
θ∈Θ
Jθ,pi(y)
)
= inf
θ∈Θ
(
sup
pi∈Π
Jθ,pi(y)
)
= sup
pi∈Π
J θˆ,pi(y) = inf
θ∈Θ
Jθ,pˆi(y) = J θˆ,pˆi(y); y ∈ S(3.10)
and
(3.11) (θˆ(y), pˆi(y)) is an optimal (Markov) control.
Proof. Choose (θ, pi) ∈ Θ× Π. Then by the Dynkin formula for jump diffu-
sions (see e.g. [25, Theorem 1.24]) we have
(3.12) Ey
[
ϕ(Y (τ (N)S ))
]
= ϕ(y) + Ey
[ τ(N)S∫
0
Aθ,piϕ(Y (t))dt
]
where Y (t) = Y θ,pi(t) and
τ
(N)
S = τS ∧N ∧ inf{t > 0; |Y (t)| ≥ N}, N = 1, 2, . . .
(I) If we apply (3.12) to θ, pˆi and use (i) for all y = Y (t) we get
Ey
[
ϕ(Y (τ (N)S ))
] ≥ ϕ(y)− Ey[ τ
(N)
S∫
0
f(Y (t), θ(Y (t)), pˆi(Y (t))dt
]
or
ϕ(y) ≤ Ey
[ τ(N)S∫
0
f(Y (t), θ(Y (t)), pˆi(Y (t)))dt+ ϕ(Y (τ (N)S ))
]
.
Letting N →∞ and using (iv) and (v) we obtain
(3.13) ϕ(y) ≤ Jθ,pˆi(y).
Since this holds for all θ ∈ Θ we deduce that
(3.14) ϕ(y) ≤ inf
θ∈Θ
Jθ,pˆi(y).
Hence
(3.15) ϕ(y) ≤ sup
pi∈Π
(
inf
θ∈Θ
Jθ,pi(y)
)
= Φ(y).
(II) Next, if we apply (3.12) to θˆ, pi, with pi ∈ Π, and use (ii) for all y = Y (t) we
get
Ey[ϕ(Y (τ (N)S ))] ≤ ϕ(y)− Ey
[ τ(N)S∫
0
f(Y (t), θˆ(Y (t)), pi(Y (t)))dt
]
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or
ϕ(y) ≥ Ey
[ τ(N)S∫
0
f(Y (t), θˆ(Y (t)), pi(Y (t)))dt+ ϕ(Y (τ (N)S ))
]
.
Letting N →∞ and using (iv) and (v) we obtain
(3.16) ϕ(y) ≥ J θˆ,pi(y) ≥ inf
θ∈Θ
Jθ,pi(y).
Since this holds for all pi ∈ Π we deduce that
(3.17) ϕ(y) ≥ sup
pi∈Π
(
inf
θ∈Θ
Jθ,pi(y)
)
= Φ(y).
(III) Finally, we apply (3.12) to θˆ, pˆi and proceed as above. Then we end up
with
(3.18) ϕ(y) = J θˆ,pˆi(y).
Combining (3.17), (3.18) and (3.15) we conclude that
Φ(y) ≤ ϕ(y) = J θˆ,pˆi(y) ≤ Φ(y),
Combining (3.16) and (3.13) we get
inf
θ∈Θ
(
sup
pi∈Π
Jθ,pi(y)
)
≤ sup
pi∈Π
J θˆ,pi(y) ≤ ϕ(y) ≤ inf
θ∈Θ
Jθ,pˆi(y)
≤ sup
pi∈Π
(
inf
θ∈Θ
Jθ,pi(y)
)
= Φ(y).(3.19)
On the other hand, we always have
(3.20) sup
pi∈Π
(
inf
θ∈Θ
Jθ,pi(y)
)
≤ inf
θ∈Θ
(
sup
pi∈Π
Jθ,pi(y)
)
.
Combining (3.19) and (3.20) with (3.18) we get (3.10) and (3.11). 
Remark 3.3 In the case when dY (t) = (dt,X(t)), Y (0) = y = (s, x) ∈ [0, T ]×
Rn it suffices to assume that ϕ ∈ C1,2((0, T ) × Rn) ∩ C(S¯). This applies to
Examples 4.1, 4.2 and 5.3.
Remark 3.4 In this paper we do not discuss the (important) question to what
extent the value function Φ is indeed a C2 function (or C1,2 function) under
some general conditions. However, we verify that this is the case in some spe-
cific examples (Example 4.1 and Example 5.3). It is known that under some
conditions the value function Φ is a viscosity solution of the corresponding HJBI
equation. See [17].
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4 Examples
Example 4.1 Let us return to the market (2.3), (2.4) in Section 2. However,
as suggested by [27], let us assume that the mean rate of return of the stock,
α(.), is not given a priori, but is the consequence of the portfolio choice pi(.) ∈ Π
of a “representative” trader. The trader tries to maximize the expected utility
of her terminal wealth by choosing her portfolio optimally, while the “market”
tries to minimize this maximum expected utility by choosing α(t) accordingly.
This leads to the min-max problem
(4.1) inf
α∈A
(
sup
pi∈Π
E[U0(V (pi)(T ))]
)
where U0 ∈ C2(0,∞) is a given utility function (in the usual sense, not neces-
sarily monetary) and A,Π are given families of admissible processes α(t), pi(t).
For simplicity we assume that γ(t, z) = z > −1 a.s. ν and that β is constant.
We assume that if (α, pi) ∈ A×Π then
(4.2) E
[ ∫ T
0
{|(1− pi(t))r(t)|+ |pi(t)α(t)|+ pi2(t)
∫
R
z2ν(dz)}dt
]
<∞,
which guarantees that V (pi)(t) > 0 for all t.
To put this problem into the framework of Section 3 we define the process
Y (t) = (Y0(t), Y1(t)) by
(4.3) dY0(t) = dt; Y0(0) = y0 = s ∈ R
and (see (2.5))
dY1(t) = dV (pi)(t) = Y1(t−)
[
{(1− pi(t))r(t) + pi(t)α(t)}dt(4.4)
+ pi(t)β dB(t) + pi(t−)
∫
R
z N˜(dt, dz)
]
; Y1(0) = y1 = x > 0.
Then problem (4.1) can be formulated as follows:
Find (α∗, pi∗) ∈ A×Π and Φ(y) = Φ(s, x) such that
(4.5) Φ(s, x) = inf
α∈A
(
sup
pi∈Π
Es,x[U0(Y
(α,pi)
1 (T ))]
)
= Es,x[U0(Y
(α∗,pi∗)
1 (T ))
]
.
In this case the generator Aα,pi has the form
Aα,piϕ(s, x) =
∂ϕ
∂s
+ x[(1− pi)r(s) + piα]∂ϕ
∂x
+ 12β
2pi2x2
∂2ϕ
∂x2
(4.6)
+
∫
R
{
ϕ(s, x+ pi xz)− ϕ(s, x)− ∂ϕ
∂x
(s, x) · pi xz
}
ν(dz)
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and the HJBI equation for this problem can be written (in compact form)
(4.7)
 infα∈K1
(
sup
pi∈K2
{Aα,piϕ(s, x)}
)
= 0; s < T
ϕ(T, x) = U0(x)
Note that we only need to have ϕ ∈ C1,2((0, T ) × (0,∞)) in this case. See
Remark 3.3.
Let us try the following function:
ϕ(s, x) = U0
(
x exp
(∫ T
s
r(t)dt
))
.
This gives
Aα,piϕ(s, x) = −U ′0(x exp(
∫ T
s
r(t)dt))x exp(
∫ T
s
r(t)dt)r(s)(4.8)
+ x[(1− pi)r(s) + piα]U ′0(x exp(
∫ T
s
r(t)dt)) exp(
∫ T
s
r(t)dt)
+
1
2
β2pi2x2U ′′0 (x exp(
∫ T
s
r(t)dt)) exp(2
∫ T
s
r(t)dt)
+
∫
R
{U0((x+ pixz) exp(
∫ T
s
r(t)dt))− U0(x exp(
∫ T
s
r(t)dt))
− U ′0(x exp(
∫ T
s
r(t)dt)) exp(
∫ T
s
r(t)dt)pixz}ν(dz)
Maximizing over pi we get the following first order condition for the maximum
point pˆi = pˆi(α):
(α− r(s))U ′0(x exp(
∫ T
s
r(t)dt))(4.9)
+ β2pˆixU ′′0 (x exp(
∫ T
s
r(t)dt)) exp(
∫ T
s
r(t)dt)
+
∫
R
{U ′0((x+ pˆixz) exp(
∫ T
s
r(t)dt))− U ′0(x exp(
∫ T
s
r(t)dt))}zν(dz) = 0
Substituting pi = pˆi(α) into (4.7) and minimizing over α gives the first order
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condition for the minimum point α = αˆ:[
− r(s)pˆi′(α) + pˆi(α) + αpˆi′(α)
]
U ′0(x exp(
∫ T
s
r(t)dt))(4.10)
+ β2pˆi(α)pˆi′(α)xU ′′0 (x exp(
∫ T
s
r(t)dt)) exp(
∫ T
s
r(t)dt)
+
∫
R
{U ′0((x+ pˆi(α)xz) exp(
∫ T
s
r(t)dt))
− U ′0(x exp(
∫ T
s
r(t)dt))}pˆi(α)zν(dz) = 0
Combining (4.9) with (4.8) we get
(4.11) pˆi(αˆ) = 0.
Substituting α = αˆ and pˆi(αˆ) = 0 in (4.8) we obtain
(4.12) αˆ(s) = r(s).
With these values of αˆ, pˆi(αˆ), we easily verify that
(4.13) Aαˆ,pˆi(αˆ)ϕ(s, x) = 0
which proves that the value function is indeed
(4.14) Φ(s, x) = ϕ(s, x) = U0
(
x exp(
∫ T
s
r(t)dt)
)
We conclude that in this virtual game between the trader and market, the
“market” reacts to the trader’s optimal portfolio choice by choosing
α = αˆ(t) = r(t) for all t ∈ [0, T ].
This corresponds to changing the original probability measure P to some equiva-
lent martingale measure Q, which is in agreement with the principle of arbitrage
free option pricing. See [27] for more discussion on this. The result above is an
extension of the result in [27] to (Markovian) stochastic processes r(s), α(s), β(s)
and to the jump diffusion case.
Example 4.2 We now use Theorem 3.2 to study Problem 2.4. First, let us
assume for simplicity that in the market (2.3)–(2.4) we have
(4.15) r(t) = 0, α(t) = α (constant), β(t) = β (constant), γ(t, z) = 0
i.e. the market is a classical Black-Scholes market.
Let Ma consist of all probability measure Q = Qθ of the form
13
dQθ = exp
(
−
T∫
0
θ0(s)dB(s)− 12
T∫
0
θ20(s)ds
)
dP (ω) on FT
where θ0(s) is Fs-adapted, E
[
exp
(
1
2
T∫
0
θ20(s)ds
)]
<∞.
We put Problem 2.4 into the framework of Section 3 by defining
(4.16) dY (t) = (dY0(t), dY1(t), dY2(t)); Y (0) = y = (s, y1, y2),
where
dY0(t) = dt; Y0(0) = s ∈ R
dY1(t) = dV (pi)(t) = Y1(t)[αpi(t)dt+ βpi(t)dB(t)]; Y1(0) = y1 > 0
dY2(t) = −θ(t)Y2(t)dB(t); Y2(0) = y2 > 0
and where we have put θ0 = θ, pi0 = pi, for simplicity of notation.
Assume that the penalty function has the form
ζ(Qθ) = E
[
ζ0
(dQθ
dP
)]
= E[ζ0(Y2(T ))] for some function ζ0 : R→ R.
Then Problem 2.4 gets the form
(4.17) Φ(y) = Φ(s, y1, y2) = sup
pi∈Π
(
inf
θ∈Θ
Es,y1,y2 [Y1(T )Y2(T ) + ζ0(Y2(T ))]
)
.
In this case the generator of Y (·) becomes
Aθ,piϕ(y) =
∂ϕ
∂s
+ y1αpi
∂ϕ
∂y1
+ 12y
2
1β
2pi2
∂2ϕ
∂y21
(4.18)
− y1y2βθpi ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
+ 12y
2
2θ
2 ∂
2ϕ
∂y22
; ϕ ∈ C20 (R3).
Then the corresponding HJBI equation becomes
(4.19)
 suppi∈K2
(
inf
θ∈K1
Aθ,piϕ(s, y1, y2)
)
= 0; s < T
ϕ(T, y1, y2) = y1y2 + ζ0(y2)
To study this equation we first fix pi ∈ K2 and minimize
h(θ) := −y1y2βθpiϕ12 + 12y22θ2ϕ22
with respect to θ. (Here ϕ12 = ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
(y) etc.) The minimum is attained at
(4.20) θ = θˆ(y) =
y1βpiϕ12
y2ϕ22
(if ϕ22 > 0).
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Substituting this into (4.18) we get to maximize
k(pi) := y1αpiϕ1 + 12y
2
1β
2pi2
(
ϕ11 − ϕ
2
12
ϕ22
)
with respect to pi. If ϕ11 <
ϕ212
ϕ22
the maximum is attained when
(4.21) pi = pˆi(y) =
αϕ1ϕ22
y1β2(ϕ212 − ϕ11ϕ22)
.
Substituting (4.19) and (4.20) into (4.18) we get the following non-linear partial
differential equation for the unknown value function ϕ:
(4.22)
{
∂ϕ
∂s +
α2ϕ21ϕ22
2β2(ϕ212−ϕ11ϕ22) = 0 ; s < T
ϕ(T, y1, y2) = y1y2 + ζ0(y2)
If the solution ϕ of this equation exists and the corresponding θˆ(y), pˆi(y) given
by (4.19)–(4.20) satisfies all the requirements of Theorem 3.2, then ϕ = Φ and
(θ∗, pi∗) := (θˆ, pˆi) is an optimal (Markov) control.
Example 4.3 Let us again use Theorem 3.2 to study Problem 2.4, but in this
case assuming that in the market (2.3)–(2.4) we have
(4.23) r(t) = 0, α(t) = α (constant), β = 0 and γ(t, z) = z.
Now let Ma consist of all probability measures Q = Qθ of the form
dQθ(ω) = Zθ1(T )dP (ω) on FT ,
where
Zθ1(t) = exp
[ t∫
0
∫
R
log(1− θ1(s, z))N˜(ds, dz)(4.24)
+
t∫
0
∫
R
{log(1− θ1(s, z)) + θ1(s, z)}ν(dz)ds; 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
Then, by the Itoˆ formula,
(4.25) dZθ1(t) = −Zθ1(t−)
∫
R
θ1(t, z)N˜(dt, dz).
Therefore, to put Problem 2.4 into the framework of Section 3 we define
(4.26) Y (t) = (Y0(t), Y1(t), Y2(t)), Y (0) = (s, y1, y2)
15
where
dY0(t) = dt; Y0(0) = s ∈ R
dY1(t) = dV (pi)(t) = Y1(t−)
[
αpi(t)dt+ pi(t−)
∫
R
zN˜(dt, dz)
]
; Y1(0) > 0
dY2(t) = −Y2(t−)
∫
R
θ1(t, z)N˜(dt, dz); Y2(0) = y2 > 0.
The generator of Y (·) then becomes (see (3.9))
Aθ1,piϕ(s, y1, y2) =
∂ϕ
∂s
+ y1αpi
∂ϕ
∂y1
(4.27)
+
∫
R
{
ϕ(s, y1 + y1piz, y2 − y2θ1(z))− ϕ(s, y1, y2)
− y1piz ∂ϕ
∂y1
+ y2θ1(z)
∂ϕ
∂y2
}
ν(dz).
Therefore, to solve the corresponding HJBI equation, we first fix pi ∈ K2 and
minimize
h(θ1(·)) :=
∫
R
{
ϕ(s, y1 + y1piz, y2 − y2θ1(z))− ϕ(s, y1, y2)
− y1piz ∂ϕ
∂y1
+ y2θ1(z)
∂ϕ
∂y2
}
ν(dz)
over all functions θ1(z).
We can minimize this pointwise for each z and get a minimum point
(4.28) θˆ1(z) = θˆ1(y, z) ∈ Argminψ(θ1)
where
ψ(θ1) = ϕ(s, y1(1 + piz), y2(1− θ1)) + y2θ1 ∂ϕ
∂y2
.
The first order condition for a minimum θˆ1 of ψ is
(4.29)
∂ϕ
∂y2
(s, y1(1 + piz), y2(1− θˆ1)) = ∂ϕ
∂y2
(s, y1, y2).
This value θˆ1 = θˆ1(y, z, pi) is substituted into (4.26), and the resulting expression
k(pi) := y1αpi
∂ϕ
∂y1
+
∫
R
{
ϕ(s, y1(1 + piz), y2(1− θˆ1(s, z, pi)))(4.30)
− y1piz ∂ϕ
∂y1
+ y2θˆ(y, z, pi)
∂ϕ
∂y2
}
ν(dz)
16
is then maximized with respect to pi. Call this maximum point pˆi = pˆi(y).
Then the pair (θˆ1(y, z, pˆi(y)), pˆi(y)) is our candidate for the optimal control,
and our candidate ϕ(y) for the value function Φ(y) is the solution of the corre-
sponding integro-differential equation
∂ϕ
∂s
+ y1αpˆi(y)
∂ϕ
∂y1
+
∫
R
{
ϕ(s, y1(1+pˆi(y)z), y2(1−θˆ1(y, z, pˆi(y))))(4.31)
− ϕ(s, y1, y2)− y1pˆi(y)z ∂ϕ
∂y1
+ y2θˆ1(y, z, pˆi(y))
∂ϕ
∂y2
}
ν(dz) = 0 for s < T ,
with boundary values
(4.32) ϕ(T, y1, y2) = y1y2 + ζ0(y2).
5 An HJBI equation for Nash equilibria of gen-
eral stochastic differential games
Let Y (t) = Y u(t) be a controlled jump diffusion, as described in (3.1). Let
u = (θ, pi), where θ = (θ0, θ1) ∈ Θ and pi = (pi0, pi) ∈ Π are admissible controls
for player 1 and 2, respectively, as in (3.5) and (3.6). Let us now assume that
there are two performance functionals of the form (with S and τS as before)
(5.1) Jui (y) = E
y
[ τs∫
0
fi(Y (t), u(t))dt+ gi(Y (τS))
]
; i = 1, 2.
We may regard Jui (y) as the payoff to player number i if the players use the
controls (θ0, θ1) and (pi0, pi1), respectively.
Definition 5.1 A pair (θ∗, pi∗) ∈ Θ × Π is called a Nash equilibrium for the
stochastic differential game (3.1), (5.1) if the following holds:
Jθ,pi
∗
1 (y) ≤ Jθ
∗,pi∗
1 (y) for all θ ∈ Θ, y ∈ S(5.2)
Jθ
∗,pi
2 (y) ≤ Jθ
∗,pi∗
2 (y) for all pi ∈ Π, y ∈ S(5.3)
Condition (5.2) states that if player 2 uses the control pi∗, then it is optimal
for player 1 to use the control θ∗. Similarly, condition (5.3) states that if player 1
uses θ∗, then it is optimal for player 2 to use pi∗. Thus (θ∗, pi∗) is an equilibrium
point in the sense that there is no reason for each individual player to deviate
from it, as long as the other player does not.
As in Section 3 we restrict ourselves to Markov controls, and we use the
same notation for Aθ,pi and T as there. The following result may be regarded
as a generalization of Theorem 3.2:
17
Theorem 5.2 (HJBI equations for Nash equilibria)
Suppose there exists functions ϕi ∈ C2(S)∩C(S¯); i = 1, 2 and a Markov control
(θˆ(y), pˆi(y)) ∈ Θ×Π such that
(i) Aθ,pˆiϕ1(y) + f1(y, θ, pˆi(y))
≤ Aθˆ,pˆiϕ1(y) + f1(y, θˆ(y), pˆi(y)) = 0 for all θ ∈ K1, y ∈ S
(ii) Aθˆ,piϕ2(y) + f2(y, θˆ(y), pi)
≤ Aθˆ,pˆiϕ2(y) + f2(y, θˆ(y), pˆi(y)) = 0 for all pi ∈ K2, y ∈ S
(iii) Aθ,pi(τS) ∈ ∂S a.s. on {τS <∞} and
lim
t→τ−S
ϕi(Y θ,pi(t)) = gi(Y θ,pi(τS))χ{τS<∞} a.s. for i = 1, 2 and for all
(θ, pi) ∈ Θ×Π.
(iv) the families {ϕi(Y θ,pi(τ))}τ∈T are uniformly integrable for all y ∈ S,
(θ, pi) ∈ Θ×Π, i = 1, 2.
Then (θˆ, pˆi) is a Nash equilibrium for the game (3.1), (5.1) and
ϕ1(y) = sup
θ∈Θ
Jθ,pˆi1 (y) = J
θˆ,pˆi
1 (y)(5.4)
ϕ2(y) = sup
pi∈Π
J θˆ,pi2 (y) = J
θˆ,pˆi
2 (y).(5.5)
Proof. We proceed as in the proof of Theorem 3.2. With Y = Y θ,pˆi(y) we
get by the Dynkin formula, using (i),
Ey[ϕ1(Y (τ
(N)
S ))] = ϕ(y) + E
y
[ τ(N)S∫
0
Aθ,pˆiϕ1(Y (t))dt
]
≤ ϕ1(y)− Ey
[ τ(N)S∫
0
f1(Y (t), θ(Y (t)), pˆi(Y (t))dt
]
.
Hence
ϕ1(y) ≥ Ey
[ τ(N)S∫
0
f1(Y (t), θ(Y (t)), pˆi(Y (t)))dt+ ϕ1(Y (τ
(N)
S ))
]
Letting N →∞ we obtain
ϕ1(y) ≥ Jθ,pˆi1 (y).
Since this holds for all θ ∈ Θ we have
(5.6) ϕ1(y) ≥ sup
θ∈Θ
Jθ,pˆi1 (y).
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Similarly, applying the argument above to the control (θˆ, pˆi) we get equality in
(5.6), i.e.
(5.7) ϕ1(y) = J
θˆ,pˆi
1 (y).
Combining (5.6) and (5.7) we get
ϕ1(y) = sup
θ∈Θ
Jθ,pˆi1 (y) = J
θˆ,pˆi
1 (y),
which is (5.4).
Statement (5.5) is proved in the same way. These two statements imply that
(θˆ, pˆi) is a Nash equilibrium and the proof is complete. 
Example 5.3 To illustrate Theorem 5.2 we use it to solve a jump diffusion
version of a problem which was solved in [24] in the continuous diffusion case
(by a different method):
Suppose the states X1(t), X2(t) of two companies at time t are described by
(5.8)
{
dX1(t) = θ(t)dt+ σ11X1(t)dη1(t) + σ12X1(t)dη2(t)
X1(0) = x1 ∈ R
and
(5.9)
{
dX2(t) = pi(t)dt+ σ21X2(t)dη1(t) + σ22X2(t)dη2(t)
X2(0) = x2 ∈ R
Here θ(t), pi(t) are the controls to be used by company 1 and 2, respectively. We
assume that σij are constants and ηi(t) =
t∫
0
∫
R
zN˜i(ds, dz) are independent pure
jump Le´vy martingales.
The payoff functionals to company 1 and company 2 are assumed to have
the form
(5.10) Jθ,pi1 (s, x1, x2) = E
x1,x2
[ T−s∫
0
−α1θ2(t)X22 (t)dt+ γ1X21 (T )X22 (T )
]
and
(5.11) Jθ,pi2 (s, x1, x2) = E
x1,x2
[ T−s∫
0
−α2pi2(t)X21 (t)dt+ γ2X21 (T )X22 (T )
]
,
respectively. Here αi and γi are positive constants, i = 1, 2.
A possible interpretation of this is that θ(t), pi(t) represent investment rates
in company 1 and 2, respectively. But for each company the size of the other
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heats up the economy in such a way that both the terminal payoff and the
energy cost rate is proportional to the squared size of the other.
To find a possible Nash equilibrium (θˆ, pˆi) ∈ Θ × Π for this game, we first
note that the generator of the process Y (t) := (s + t,X1(t), X2(t)) is given by,
with y = (s, x1, x2),
Aθ,piϕ(y) =
∂ϕ
∂s
+ θ
∂ϕ
∂x1
+ pi
∂ϕ
∂x2
+
∫
R
{
ϕ(s, x1 + x1σ11z, x2 + x2σ21z)
− ϕ(s, x1, x2)− x1σ11z ∂ϕ
∂x1
− x2σ21z ∂ϕ
∂x2
}
ν1(dz)
+
∫
R
{
ϕ(s, x1 + x1σ12z, x2 + x2σ22z)
− ϕ(s, x1, x2)− x1σ12z ∂ϕ
∂x1
− x2σ22z ∂ϕ
∂x2
}
ν2(dz)(5.12)
where νi(dz) are the Le´vy measures of ηi(·), respectively, i = 1, 2.
We also note that in this problem we have
f1(s, x1, x2, θ, pi) = −α1θ2x22, g1(s, x1, x2) = γ1x21x22
and
f2(s, x1, x2, θ, pi) = −α2pi2x21, g2(s, x1, x2) = γ2x21x22.
We first fix pi ∈ R, (s, x1, x2) ∈ R3 and maximize
(5.13) Aθ,piϕ1(s, x1, x2) + f1(s, x1, x2, θ, pi)
with respect to θ, for a given function ϕ1 (to be determined). This amounts to
maximizing
h1(θ) :=
θ∂ϕ1
∂x1
− α1θ2x22; θ ∈ R .
The maximum is attained at
(5.14) θ = θˆ = 12α
−1
1 x
−2
2 ·
∂ϕ1
∂x1
.
For this choice of θ and with pi = pˆi (to be determined) we are required to have
Aθˆ,pˆiϕ1(y) + f1(y, θˆ(y), pˆi(y)) = 0
i.e.
∂ϕ1
∂s
+ 12α
−1
1 x
−2
2
(∂ϕ1
∂x1
)2
+ pˆi
∂ϕ1
∂x2
+
2∑
j=1
∫
R
{
ϕ1(s, x1
+ x1σ1jz, x2 + x2σ2jz)− ϕ1(s, x1, x2)− x1σ1jz ∂ϕ1
∂x1
− x2σ2jz ∂ϕ1
∂x2
}
νj(dz)− 14α−11 x−22
(∂ϕ1
∂x1
)2
= 0.(5.15)
20
Let us try functions ϕi of the form
(5.16) ϕi(s, x1, x2) = ki(s)x21x
2
2; i = 1, 2
where ki(s) are functions to be determined. Then
(5.17) θˆ = α−11 k1(s)x1
and (5.15) gets the form
(5.18) k′1(s) + α
−1
1 k
2
1(s) + 2k1(s)
pˆi
x2
+ ak1(s) = 0,
where
a =
2∑
j=1
∫
R
z2
{
4σ1jσ2j + σ21j + σ
2
2j
+ z(2σ1jσ22j + 2σ2jσ
2
1j) + z
2σ21jσ
2
2j
}
νj(dz).(5.19)
Similarly, if we fix θ and maximize Aθ,piϕ2(s, x1, x2) + f2(s, x1, x2, θ, pi) with
respect to pi we find the maximum point
pi = pˆi = 12α
−1
2 x
−2
1
∂ϕ2
∂x2
= α−12 k2(s)x2
and the requirement
Aθˆ,pˆiϕ2(y) + f2(y, θˆ(y), pˆi(y)) = 0
leads to the equation
(5.20) k′2(s) + 2α
−1
1 k1(s)k2(s) + α
−1
2 k
2
2(s) + ak2(s) = 0.
Combining (5.18) and (5.20) we get the 2-dimensional Riccati equation
k′1(s) + α
−1
1 k
2
1(s) + 2α
−1
2 k1(s)k2(s) + ak1(s) = 0; s < T(5.21)
k′2(s) + α
−1
2 k
2
2(s) + 2α
−1
1 k1(s)k2(s) + ak2(s) = 0; s < T(5.22)
k(T ) =
[
γ1
γ2
]
(5.23)
These equations can be solved explicitly using standard methods for solving
Riccati equations, on the condition that our coefficients are such that k1 and k2
do not explode. See e.g [29] for information about Riccati equations.
Based on Theorem 5.2 and Remark 3.3 we can summarize the above as
follows:
21
Theorem 5.4 Let k(s) =
[
k1(s)
k2(s)
]
be the solution of the Riccati equation (5.21)–
(5.23). Then the pair (θˆ, pˆi) given by
(5.24) θˆ(s, x1, x2) = α−11 k1(s)x1, pˆi(s, x1, x2) = α
−1
2 k2(s)x2
is a Nash equilibrium of the jump diffusion game (5.8)–(5.11). The correspond-
ing equilibrium performances are
(5.25) ϕi(s, x1, x2) = J
θˆ,pˆi
i (s, x1, x2) = ki(s)x
2
1x
2
2; i = 1, 2.
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